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Seeking Justice for Scott Dyleski and Pamela Vitale

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What Happened to Pamela?

Who is Scott Dyleski?

The Witness

Lead Detective Lies

Scott's Rock Solid Alibi

The Long Shower

The Dog Trail

The Glove

The Blond Hairs on Pam

The Big Screen TV

Fred Curiel

Alibi and Time of Death

Prosecutor Hal Jewett

Fraud and Murder?

A Planted List???

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Curiel vs CCC

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Bombshells on Day Four

Testimony Continues

Curiel Alibi "Confusion"

Immunity and Inept Cops

David Curiel- A Liar?

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Scott Dyleski did not have the resources to hire a private lawyer. He had no choice but to allow Contra Costa County to decide who would represent him at trial. Contra Costa County Public Defender David Coleman decided that person would be Ellen Leonida.


Ellen Leonida
Ellen Leonida
Juror number 7

Question from ally: What did you think of the defense?


Peter De Cristofaro: Weak. It was almost all character witnesses and even the number of character witnesses was not that much. I personally would have liked to have seen more, or an alternate theory as to who might have done it. If Scott Dyleski didn't do it, I would have liked to have seen Ellen Leonida give us an alternate theory to the crime. She never did. source


Observations by former attorney Kate Dixon:

Despite this history of abuse and drug use, no mental defense was ever presented by Leonida.  She only presented the “he’s a good boy” defense.  Her alibi defense, which she promised to the jury in her opening statement, was based on the testimony of Fred Curiel . That alibi crumbled when, on the day of trial, Fred Curiel abruptly stated he couldn’t remember if he saw Scott Dyleski at all during the morning of the murder, let alone give an exact time that Dyleski was in his home, and not at Pamela Vitale's home.  Leonida apparently did not pin Fred Curiel’s testimony down, one way or the other, with declarations or tape recordings before she embarked on a defense almost totally based upon the alibi.


Leonida’s only remaining defense, promised in the opening argument, was that there was third-party DNA inside the bloody glove found in Dyleski’s duffel bag.  Yet she never presented one DNA expert to explain that contention or to rebut any DNA testimony presented by the prosecution.  She never showed that some of the statistics presented were actually meaningless in their import.  She never presented an expert to rebut the shoe imprint found at the scene and on Pamela Vitale’s shoulder.  That partial print of a Land’s End shoe, according to the prosecution’s expert, could not be matched with certainty.  Yet, it was the basis of the conviction.

Leonida did not interview the jurors.  Why?  She never filed a motion for new trial. (Note and compare: Susan Polk, briefly represented by Daniel Horowitz and convicted of second degree murder for the death of her husband while representing herself, has been given a six month continuance, a transcript of the trial and the appointment of a prominent lawyer, in order to file a motion for new trial in January 2007.)
 

According to the Contra Costa Times, Leonida had conducted the defense of only one murder case before the Dyleski case.  However, she did win a drunk driving case wherein it turned out the victim was driving on the street the wrong way.  Yet, the public defender’s office put the inexperienced Leonida up against one of the top homicide DAs in California.  She simply could not or did not present a defense.  Her cross-examinations consisted of just a few questions.  Time of death was never established, for example, through her cross-examination of the coroner.  Testing of third-party DNA was not conducted, even though blonde hair was found on the back of the deceased.  Leonida abandoned all expert testimony in favor of character witnesses in a defense that was fatally flawed.


However, it is apparent that in order to defend Dyleski, Leonida adopted a more or less Goth appearance.  See a current photograph above and compare it to the photograph of her on the Contra Costa Public Defender’s website seen here on the left side of this paragraph. Why did she go so Goth in appearance when there was only testimony at trial that her client Scott Dyleski gave up Goth about a year before the murder?  Her appearance reminded the jury daily of Goth as she sat at the defense table next to her clean cut client.  And DA Jewett referenced Goth practices and lifestyle as a context for Dyleski’s motive to murder.  This was a trial----- not a costume ball! (See Photo's below)
 

The September 28, 2006, the Contra Costa Times in an article by Bruce Gertsman announced that just three days after the sentencing of Scott Dyleski to life in prison without parole Ellen Leonida resigned from the Contra Costa Public defender's office to "move on".

Source


Ellen Leonida
Ellen Leonida before Scott's trial
Ellen Leonida
Ellen Leonida at Scott's trial


Moving On........


INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL - Ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal violates the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. In analyzing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the overriding concern is to determine whether counsel's conduct so undermined the functioning of the adversary process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).

First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Id. at 687. Review of counsel's performance is highly deferential, and courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689.

'Actual or constructive denial of assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice. So are various kinds of state interference with counsel's assistance.' 466 U.S. at 692 (citing U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659, n.25 (1983). In Cronic, the Court described the type of situation from which prejudice is presumed. When counsel is totally absent, is prevented from assisting the accused at a critical stage of the proceeding, or when counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, courts will presume prejudice. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 & n.25.


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